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C O N S U M E R L A W
What Triggers the Statute
of Limitations for Violations
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 17-22. © 2001 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Does the two-year statute of limita-
tions for violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) com-
mence upon the "occurrence" of the
violation or upon the debtor's "dis-
covery" of the violation?
FACTS
On June 17, 1993, respondent
Adelaide Andrews went to the office
of a radiologist for an X-ray. Because
she had not been to that office
before, she filled out a patient infor-
mation form, listing personal infor-
mation such as her birth date,
Social Security number, and driver's
license number. Respondent then
handed the form to a receptionist
named Andrea Andrews who, unbe-
knownst to respondent, at some
point took the information in the
form, moved to Las Vegas, and
began impersonating respondent.
Using respondent's Social Security
and driver's license numbers as well
as a conglomeration of respondent's
and her own name, the imposter
rented an apartment and obtained
both telephone and electric service.
The imposter also made several
attempts to obtain credit and other
services using respondent's identity.
On July 25, 1994, the imposter
applied for credit with First
Consumers National Bank (FCNB)
using respondent's Social Security
number and birth date. In response,
the bank requested a credit report,
and petitioner provided FCNB with
information from respondent's file.
After reviewing the report from peti-
tioner, FCNB denied the imposter's
application. On Sept. 27, 1994, the
imposter applied for cable service
from Prime Cable of Las Vegas using
respondent's Social Security num-
ber. Prime Cable did open a cable
account at the imposter's Las Vegas
residence. Prime Cable also request-
ed a credit report, and petitioner
once again provided information
from respondent's file.
Subsequently, the imposter applied
for credit with other companies,
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which similarly requested credit
reports and petitioner again provid-
ed information from respondent's
file. In October 1994, the imposter
applied for credit at Dillard's depart-
ment store using respondent's Social
Security number, and Dillard's
requested a credit report from Trans
Union, another national credit
bureau. Trans Union provided credit
information from respondent's Trans
Union file to the store. Dillard's
granted the imposter credit. The
imposter also failed to pay her cable
bills or make her rent payments,
and both accounts were eventually
referred for collection.
In late May and early June 1995,
respondent discovered the
imposter's activities and the result-
ing disclosures of her credit records.
The sequence of events began on
May 31, 1995, when respondent
went to a lending institution to
inquire about refinancing her home
mortgage. The institution ran a rou-
tine check on her credit with a
credit-reporting agency, which
assembled information from the
three national credit bureaus. At
that time, the three national credit
bureaus were Equifax, Trans Union,
and petitioner TRW Inc. The report,
which was shown to respondent,
listed the imposter's delinquent
Dillard's account. Respondent decid-
ed not to apply for refinancing from
that lending institution, and eventu-
ally obtained an equity line from
Merrill Lynch, at a higher rate of
interest.
That same day, respondent contact-
ed TRW and requested disclosure of
all information in its file on respon-
dent. The disclosure that was print-
ed on May 31, 1995, showed the
Dillard's account as well as a listing
of parties who recently received
credit reports on respondent. After
reviewing the disclosure, respondent
recognized that credit reports had
been issued to FCNB, Prime Cable,
and others based upon applications
by someone else. Thereafter, she
contacted Dillard's, the Las Vegas
Police Department, TRW's fraud
department, and others informing
them of the imposter's various
activities.
On Oct. 21, 1996, almost 17 months
after discovering the imposter's
activities, and more than two years
after TRW's disclosures of respon-
dent's file to FCNB and Prime Cable,
respondent sued both petitioner and
Trans Union in district court.
Respondent claimed that TRW had
violated the Act by disclosing those
reports in connection with the
imposter's activities. Respondent
also alleged that TRW had violated
the FCRA by erroneously including
the imposter's account with Dillard's
in her file. In addition, respondent
claimed that Trans Union had pre-
pared inaccurate credit reports,
made unauthorized disclosures of
her file, and failed to reinvestigate
and correct the information in her
file.
Prior to trial, petitioner moved for
partial summary judgment on the
improper disclosure claims. The dis-
trict court found that the claims
based upon the FCNB and Prime
Cable disclosures were barred by
the FCRA's statute of limitations
because they were brought more
than two years after the disclosures.
The two-year misrepresentation
exception did not apply because
respondent did not claim that there
had been any misrepresentation
under the Act. Although respondent
claimed that the running of the
statute of limitations was delayed
until May 1995, when she discov-
ered the disclosures, the district
court disagreed. The court reasoned
that the plain language of Section
618 did not incorporate a general
discovery rule and that the section's
explicit "discovery" exception for
misrepresentations precluded the
implication of an additional, unstat-
ed, and more general exception.
The district court entered partial
summary judgment on the disclo-
sure claims. Andrews v. Trans
Union Corp. Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d
1056 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
The case went to trial on the inac-
curacy claims. At trial the jury ren-
dered a verdict in favor of TRW. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the jury's verdict on the inaccuracy
claims but vacated the district
court's grant of partial summary
judgment on the improper disclo-
sure claims. Andrews v. TRW, Inc.,
225 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000). In
reversing the district court's ruling
on the statute of limitations, the
court of appeals relied upon what it
characterized as the general federal
rule that a federal statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until a
party knows or has reason to know
that she was injured. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on March 5,
2001. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 121
S.Ct. 1223 (2001).
CASE ANALYSIS
Credit bureaus and other consumer
reporting agencies play a vital role
in making credit available to
American consumers. They facili-
tate credit, insurance, and employ-
ment decisions by providing reports
that help their users gauge the risk
of extending credit, insurance, or
employment to a consumer.
Approximately 2 million credit
reports are purchased every work-
day. Consumers can, however, be
denied credit or other opportunities
due to inaccurate reports.
Consumers, therefore, have an
interest in keeping the information
in those reports accurate and pri-
vate. Accordingly, in 1970, Congress
passed the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which was revised extensively
in 1996, to regulate the credit
reporting industry.
Issue No. 1
The FCRA strikes a balance
between the interests of consumers
in accuracy and privacy on the one
hand, and the needs of the credit
reporting industry and the credit
information users it serves on the
other by requiring reporting agen-
cies to adopt reasonable procedures
to ensure accuracy, confidentiality,
and the proper utilization of the
information they collect. 11 U.S.C. §
1681b. The FCRA also requires such
agencies to follow reasonable proce-
dures to assure the maximum possi-
ble accuracy of the information in
their reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
The FCRA provides specialized
remedies for violations of the Act.
For negligent violations, the Act cre-
ates a private right of action for
damages sustained as the result of
the violation, which entitles suc-
cessful plaintiffs to attorney's fees.
15 U.S.C. § 1681o. The Act also cre-
ates a right of action for willful vio-
lations, which provides for statutory
and punitive damages as well as
compensatory damages and attor-
ney's fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. The
limitations period in Section 618
governs the Act's private rights of
action and precludes actions
brought two years after "liability
arises."
Petitioner TRW asserts that Section
618 does not condition the running
of the statute of limitations on the
"discovery" of any fact. Quite the
contrary, it adopts the traditional
commencement rule that begins the
statute when the formal right to sue
under the Act attaches. Under the
traditional commencement rule,
statutes of limitations begin to run
when the plaintiff has a "complete
and present cause of action." In
other words, limitations periods tra-
ditionally begin to run at the time of
the occurrence of a judicially recog-
nizable injury or event constituting
a breach of duty even if the plaintiff
was unaware of the accrual of his or
her cause of action. The traditional
rule is still the norm in most areas
of the law.
Since the middle of the last century,
the "discovery" rule, which delays
the running of the statute of limita-
tions until "discovery" of injury or
some other crucial fact, has been
extended outside the fraud context
in which it was originally developed,
but only into areas such as medical
malpractice and product liability.
The rule has not been generally
applied to defamation and invasion
of privacy, which are the types of
claims normally brought in connec-
tion with a credit-reporting viola-
tion. In addition, at the time the
FCRA was enacted, credit-reporting
claims were subject to the tradition-
al commencement rule, not the
"discovery" rule. As federal statutes
covering areas traditionally regulat-
ed by the common law are pre-
sumed to retain long-established
principles, the FCRA would have to
explicitly adopt the "discovery" rule
to depart from that tradition. In
fact, in more than a dozen statutes
since 1933, Congress has expressly
linked the commencement of limita-
tions periods to the "discovery" of a
claim or fact. On each occasion,
Congress expressly used the word
"discovery" to adopt a discovery
rule.
TRW argues that the limited discov-
ery provision in Section 618's mis-
representation exception precludes
implication of a more general dis-
covery rule. Section 618 expressly
includes a discovery rule that
applies when certain misrepresenta-
tions are made. Under the misrepre-
sentation exception, when a defen-
dant has "materially and willfully
misrepresented any information
required under this subchapter to
be disclosed," and the information
misrepresented is "material to the
establishment of the defendant's lia-
bility under this title," a claim based
upon the liability may be brought
"within two years after discovery by
the individual of the misrepresenta-
tion." 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. The pres-
ence of this express exception to
the general rule governing claims
under the Act precludes implication
of an unstated general discovery
rule. It is well settled that when
Congress explicitly enumerates
exceptions to a statute, additional
unstated exceptions generally can-
not be implied into the statute.
Petitioner also asserts that the mis-
representation exception precludes
the implication of a general discov-
ery rule because such a rule would
render the limited discovery provi-
sion superfluous. Such an interpre-
tation reads out of the Act the mis-
representation requirement in
which Congress specifically directed
application of the discovery rule. It
is an elementary canon of construc-
tion that a statute should be inter-
preted so as not to render one part
inoperative. Since a general discov-
ery rule would basically swallow the
limited discovery provision of the
misrepresentation exception, such
a rule cannot be implied into
Section 618.
TRW believes that the carefully
crafted "notice and access" provi-
sions in the FCRA make a judicially
implied "discovery" rule both
unnecessary and inappropriate. The
FCRA imposes a number of notifica-
tion requirements that inform con-
sumers about the disclosure and use
of their credit information. For
example, the Act requires disclosure
of adverse actions taken on the
basis of a consumer report. The
FCRA also entitles consumers to
access files kept on them by con-
sumer reporting agencies and infor-
mation concerning the use of those
files. For example, upon a con-
sumer's request, the Act requires
agencies to disclose "all information
(Continued on Page 20)
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in the consumer's file at the time of
the request." 15 U.S.C. §
1681(a)(1). These notification and
access provisions work together to
enable consumers to discover viola-
tions of the Act in a timely fashion.
Thus, the FCRA provides consumers
with the means to quickly discover
any improper disclosure of an inves-
tigative report and any inaccurate
information in their files that has
harmed them. These provisions
obviate the need for a "discovery"
rule. I
Petitioner also believes that a gener-
al discovery rule would upset the
balance struck by Congress in the
FCRA. Statutes of limitations strike
a balance between competing inter-
ests. On the one hand, the public
has an interest in "protecting valid
claims." On the other hand, both
defendants and the public have a
significant interest in "repose,"
which is the basic objective that
underlies limitations periods. Thus
statutes of limitations limit the liti-
gation of claims after memories
have faded, witnesses have disap-
peared, and other evidence has dis-
appeared. Accordingly, a statute of
limitations reflects a value judgment
concerning the point at which inter-
ests in favor of protecting valid
claims are outweighed by the inter-
ests in prohibiting the prosecution
of stale ones. The addition of a
"discovery" rule to a statute of
limitations significantly alters this
balance.
By delaying the commencement of
the limitations period, a "discovery"
rule increases the effective length of
time during which a defendant is
subject to suit. In so doing, the rule
arguably affords greater protection
to valid claims. At the same time,
however, by increasing the effective
period in which claims may be
brought, the "discovery" rule
decreases the certainty the statute
affords and increases the risk of liti-
gating stale claims. Thus, applica-
tion of the "discovery" rule tips the
balance struck by a statute of limi-
tations in favor of protecting claims
and against repose.
Moreover, a general "discovery" rule
would directly increase the petition-
er's cost of doing business. Credit
reporting is an information busi-
ness. The industry sells more than
550 million reports each workday.
The national credit bureaus alone
maintain files on nearly 200 million
consumers, and these files are
updated monthly with more than 2
billion pieces of information. By
extending the effective length of
time in which claims may be
brought, a general "discovery" rule
would require credit reporting agen-
cies to retain records for longer
periods of time, thereby adding to
the credit industry's already massive
burden of storing information.
Petitioner also contends that the
adoption of a "discovery" rule would
directly conflict with the history of
the FCRA. In 1970, a general "dis-
covery" rule was specifically pro-
posed to Congress for adoption. The
proposal was not incorporated into
the FCRA. Further, at the time of
the adoption of the FCRA, credit
industry officials testified that the
two-year statute of limitations peri-
od accurately reflected existing
record-keeping practices. Thus the
adoption of a "discovery" rule would
directly contradict the historical
context of the statute.
Finally, TRW believes that
Congress's subsequent treatment of
the FCRA also belies respondent's
claim that Congress intended to
incorporate a general "discovery"
rule into Section 618. In 1996,
Congress enacted the Consumer
Credit Reform Act, which revised
nearly every section of the FCRA. In
so doing, however, Congress did not
amend Section 618. This omission
is significant because at the time of
the revisions every court of appeals
to consider the question had reject-
ed the argument that Section 618
implicitly incorporated a general
"discovery" rule. Congress is pre-
sumed to be aware of settled judicial
interpretation of a statute's language
when it reenacts or amends a
statute and to adopt that interpreta-
tion when it does not change the
language. Thus the 1996 amend-
ments to the FCRA undermine the
claim that Section 618 contains a
general "discovery" rule.
Respondent, on the other hand,
maintains that under any reason-
able interpretation of the FCRA, her
initial discovery of her injuries
should trigger the accrual of her
FCRA claims. Statutory interpreta-
tion begins with the statutory lan-
guage itself. Congress presumptively
uses words in their known and ordi-
nary sense. The term arises com-
monly refers to a "springing up,"
"coming into notice," or presenta-
tion. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines arise as "to spring up, come
into notice, 'come up,' present
itself." Applying this common mean-
ing of arises to Section 618, the
statute literally expresses a "discov-
ery" rule. Thus FCRA liability "aris-
es" only when it springs up, comes
into notice, or presents itself to the
consumer. Therefore, from respon-
dent Andrews's point of view, not
one element of TRW's alleged liabili-
ty sprang up, came into notice,
came up, or presented itself before
May 31, 1995, when she first discov-
ered that she had a credit problem.
The alternative definition of arises
is "comes into existence." If one
applies this alternative definition,
"liability arises" under the FCRA
when it first comes into existence.
The term liability can have a broad
variety of meanings. Liability exists
under the FCRA when all the neces-
sary elements of a statutory cause of
Issue No. 1
action coalesce--duty, breach, cau-
sation, and injury. Liability arises
when one suffers injury as a result
of any breach of duty owed him by
another. Under FCRA, liability is
expressly and narrowly defined.
Pursuant to FCRA's principal liabili-
ty provision, civil liability for negli-
gent noncompliance exists only
where actual damages are sustained
by the consumer as a result of the
defendant's failure to comply with
the FCRA. Thus, under FCRA, no
liability arises before the consumer
realizes actual damages.
Here, Andrews realized no actual
damages prior to May 31, 1995-the
date on which she first discovered
TRW's violations or, more accurate-
ly, suffered any effects because of
them. Only then were her potential,
unrealized damages transformed
into actual damages. Simply put,
because Andrews had not yet suf-
fered actual injury, she had no
FCRA claim to bring before May 31,
1995.
Respondent also reasons that a "dis-
covery" rule is the only interpreta-
tion that can be reconciled with the
purpose of a statute of limitations.
The purpose of a statute of limita-
tions is to encourage the reasonably
diligent presentation of a claim.
Obviously, a claimant cannot pre-
sent a claim until he or she has
knowledge of it. Therefore, the "dis-
covery" rule is the only rule that is
consistent with the purpose of a
statute of limitations.
Andrews also asserts that specific
textual changes made when
Congress drafted Section 618 indi-
cates that its limitations period does
not start running upon the "occur-
rence" of a statutory violation. The
FCRA was first introduced in the
Senate in 1969. The Senate bill pro-
posed an extremely restrictive two-
year statute of limitations reflecting
an "occurrence" rule. During 1969
and 1970, however, the House con-
sidered competing proposals for gov-
erning the credit reporting industry.
The House favorite provided a rela-
tively expansive, five-year limita-
tions period-albeit, like the Senate
bill, keyed to the "occurrence" of a
violation. Congressional conferees
then met and refashioned the FCRA
into its final form. When the FCRA
emerged from conference, it con-
tained a new and different Section
618. No longer was it keyed to the
date of the "occurrence" of the vio-
lation. Instead, it was keyed to
when "liability arises."
An obvious explanation for Section
618's ultimate language is that
Congress compromised by choosing
a more accommodating statute of
limitations. The ultimate statute is
neither the two-year, most restric-
tive type of violation "occurrence"
statute sought by the Senate, nor
the five-year, but otherwise similar,
statute favored by the House.
Rather, the final enactment suggests
a moderate bridging of the differ-
ence between the two houses of
Congress. Few principles of statuto-
ry construction are more compelling
than the proposition that Congress
does not intend sub silentio to
adopt statutory language that it had
earlier discarded in favor of other
language.
Respondent believes that, contrary
to TRW's assertion, applying a "dis-
covery" rule to Section 618's prima-
ry provision does not render the
misrepresentation exception super-
fluous. Rather, Andrews believes
that the misrepresentation excep-
tion operates to extend but not
truncate the FCRA's primary limita-
tions period. Indeed, the misrepre-
sentation exception reflects
Congress's insistence that any dili-
gent consumer who already suspects
a reporting agency's violation but is
then willfully deceived about such
matters, does not lose his day in
court through the lapse of time
while deceived.
In other words, the two "discovery"
rules can operate simultaneously. A
crucial distinction must be made
between (1) the initial discovery of
an actual injury or violation in the
normal situation, and (2) the entire-
ly distinguishable discovery of a
reporting agency's subsequent, will-
ful misconduct in the more egre-
gious situation. These two different
situations involve the discovery of
different misconduct. Although both
rules commence upon "discovery,"
the primary rule commences upon
"discovery" of a violation, and the
misrepresentation exception com-
mences upon "discovery" of the
misrepresentation. The rules are
harmonious even though they oper-
ate independently. Therefore,
Section 618's misrepresentation
exception is both compatible with,
and entirely distinguishable from,
the application of a "discovery" rule
in Section 618's primary provision.
Respondent also asserts that TRW's
interpretation of the FCRA statute is
internally inconsistent. Andrews
asks why Congress would give con-
sumers two full years in which to
file suit after discovering the falsity
of a misrepresentation that had
interrupted the running of an earlier
limitations period but not give them
two full years in the first instance.
Common sense suggests that
Congress would afford consumers
two full years to marshal a federal
lawsuit after discovering either type
of misconduct.
Andrews also disputes TRW's claim
that the FCRA notice and access
provisions make a "discovery" rule
unnecessary and inappropriate. In
reality, victims of identity theft and
other improper privacy breaches
receive no timely notices of any
kind. Victims discover an identity
(Continued on Page 22)
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theft on average after 15 months,
and at least 20 percent learn of the
problem after two years. In this
case, TRW breached Andrews's
financial privacy four times before
May 31, 1995. Andrews received no
notice about any of these privacy
breaches until after she sought to
refinance her home-more than 10
months after the first violation.
Ironically, it was the imposter (as
the would-be credit applicant),
rather than Andrews, who received
any required notice whenever the
imposter suffered an "adverse
action."
Finally, respondent quarrels with
TRW's claim that a "discovery" rule
burdens credit reporting agencies
with additional record-keeping and
costs. Some states (e.g., California,
Ohio, and Georgia) have already
subjected reporting agencies to a
"discovery" rule. Because TRW's
successor in interest, Experian, and
its credit reporting brethren do
business in those states, one can
assume that they have in place pro-
cedures aimed at complying with
those states' "discovery" rules. Thus
affirming the "discovery" rule here
will not add significantly to the
industry's data-keeping burdens.
Indeed, apart from occasionally
being required to defend the reason-
ableness of procedures in place at a
given time (and perhaps pay dam-
ages), no substantial, additional
financial burdens would befall
reporting agencies if the Supreme
Court were to apply the injury "dis-
covery" rule.
SIGNIFICANCE
In 1970, Congress enacted the Fair
Credit Reporting Act as Title VI of
the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. The Acts were intended to pro-
vide for plenary regulation of the
national consumer credit industry.
Consumer credit has expanded
exponentially in the past 50 years
and is now one of the largest sectors
of the national economy. Growing
from $6 billion at the end of World
War II, outstanding consumer credit
debt rose to $116 billion in 1970
when Congress enacted the FCRA
and reached more than $700 billion
by 1993. By March 2001, consumer
credit had passed $1.5 trillion.
To support this phenomenal level of
activity, only eight years ago the
consumer reporting industry main-
tained 450 million credit files on
more than 110 million individuals
and processed almost 2 billion
pieces of data per month. Now the
database of just one of the three
major consumer reporting agencies
contains information on the person-
al financial habits of 190 million
persons, virtually the entire adult
population of the country, and that
agency alone processes approxi-
mately 1.5 billion records per
month. Despite the intent of
Congress in adopting the FCRA,
accurate information is not being
consistently provided by the con-
sumer reporting system. In the
deliberations that culminated with
the 1996 FCRA amendments,
Congress was presented with stag-
gering statistics that nearly half of
all consumer reports (48 percent)
maintained by the three major con-
sumer reporting agencies contain
inaccurate information, and nearly
one out of five (19 percent) contain
errors that could adversely affect
the consumer's eligibility for credit.
In the center of this controversy
surrounding the accuracy of credit
reports is the FCRA statute of limi-
tations, which provides a two-year
limit on claims against the reporting
agency from the date "liability aris-
es." Consumer groups assert that
the two years commence upon "dis-
covery" of the FCRA violation. They
believe such a rule would encourage
more accurate credit reports
because of the extended threat of
private enforcement. The credit
industry, however, argues that the
two years should commence upon
the "occurrence" of the violation,
and that the consumer's knowledge
of the violation is irrelevant. The
credit industry asserts that the
"occurrence" is the rule traditional-
ly used in a statute of limitations
and is the rule that most closely
comports with industry practices.
The Supreme Court now will decide
whether "liability arises" under the
FCRA upon "discovery" of the viola-
tion or its "occurrence."
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Issue No. 1
